Argumentation Ethics: The Justice of Capitalism (Studyblog ATSC, Ch 7)

An argument exclusively based on utilitarianism is not enough to win everyone over to embrace a future capitalist society. Even though such a society would produce the highest amount of wealth for its members (for all classes) relative to any form or degree of socialism, there are many who will still subscribe to socialism for reasons that they believe outweigh the fact that theirs is an economically inferior system. They believe that "justice and fairness" must be balanced with economic wealth. That it is required to sacrifice economic wealth to obtain the former.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe in this chapter----"The Ethical Justification of Capitalism and Why Socialism is Morally Indefensible"----of ATSC deals with this. He persuasively shows that no system but capitalism is ethically justifiable. The question of what is ethically justifiable or not can only be determined in argumentation and that argumentation itself presupposes the natural theory of property. Any theory, then, against the natural theory is impossible to justify because the act of justification in argumentation already presupposes the natural theory. Man can attempt to justify anti-natural theories (and/or enforce such), but he will get caught up in a performative contradiction.

Of all the other essays I have read by Hoppe on this subject this chapter is his best defense. But it still feels incomplete, in my view, if not combined with reading "Four Critical Replies" in the appendix section to his book The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. You can read that online here.

Review: The Task of Ethics and Economics

Political philosophy and political economy overlap in the sense that both fields are fields of thought at all because scarcity exists.

In ethics, or political philosophy, the question of control over property can only come about when there is property. For there to be property there must be scarcity, otherwise everything would exist in superabundance, like in the Garden of Eden, and man's actions on anything tangible would have no repercussions on his present or future supply of it or any other man's present or future supply. Therefore conflict would not be possible. Conflict becomes possible with undefined property rights over scarce goods.

Economics deals with man's actions in a world of scarcity. What actions are and what they imply. How scarce resources with alternative uses are put into use. What happens if certain economic measures are institutionalized against property and voluntary exchange. Etc.

The "Emotivist" Claim

Following the empiricism-positivism of the last chapter, it is asserted that normative statements do not exist and instead only express preferences. They are said to be not "cognitive."

In the same way that empiricism-positivism is self-defeating so is the emotivist position. The above statement must be analytical, empirical, or "an expression of emotions."

If it is analytical, then it is word play and says nothing. If it is empirical, then it fails because the emotivist position can not only be true but also false. If it is an expression of emotions, then another's emotional interpretation would be just as valid as well. Taking the emotivist statement as a meaningful one is contradictory to its premise because it could never get to the point to saying what it says if it could not say it.

With that said, however, it must be meaningful in the sense that it proposes something and that it can be discussed.  This cannot be denied because it is impossible to deny that it cannot be discussed without discussing it.

Hence all propositions must be able to be argued by acting individuals and, furthermore, a rationalist approach for the subject of ethics must be taken.

Any claim of truth and validity must be argued. Denying this would make one caught up in a contradiction. Man cannot deny that he cannot argue because it is implicit in his denial.

This is the "a priori of communication and argumentation."

The Arrival of Ethics

The subject of ethics----of justice and injustice----comes about via man. It does not come about through the trees or animals. To decide what is just or not requires that man must be able to propose such propositions to other men. Their validity can only be interpreted and deduced through argumentation.

The source of rights, writes Hoppe, "is and must be argumentation as the manifestation of our rationality."

It should be further mentioned that this process comes about via individual man. Ethics, therefore, must be methodologically individualist. After all, only individuals can think and act. There exists no group mind or collective mind. Any 'group' that acts is nothing but individuals who are acting within a man-made, individual-made group.

The "a priori of argumentation" vs. the "a priori of action"

Hoppe says that these two aprioristic based axioms are "interwoven." Just like it is impossible to deny that man acts it is also impossible to deny that man argues. Action is more fundamental to argumentation in that to argue anything requires action first. It is a subclass of action. In an intellectual sense of discovery, however, argumentation is more fundamental to action epistemologically because discussing and understanding action is done through argumentation.

Augmentation is an Action

Being a form of action, since argumentation is "a practical affair," requires that norms exist. These norms make argumentation possible and must therefore be prerequisites for all propositions to be possibly validated as true.

Norms, as just described, must be regarded as existing. Arguing otherwise would presuppose these norms and destroy one's argument against what has thus far been said as true a priori.

These norms derive from argumentation.

Norms Implied in Argumentation

As in the "Golden Rule of ethics or in the Kantian Categorical Imperative," any norm proposals must be "universalizable."

Argumentation implies that all acting arguers, or potential/future ones, must be able to judge and debate the given norms. Any ethical proposition must apply equalized standards on everyone. Put in another way: they all must have equal access or authority, in a manner of speaking, in the course of arguing. One in the course of argumentation cannot say "I am bigger and so you cannot debate with me." That would not be a debate, by definition. (And there is no way to say a priori that one man versus another gets greater rights.)

Thus: Any ethical proposition that would apply different standards on different people would fail to pass the test of universalization.

This alone would destroy an infinite number of ethical propositions, but would leave open an infinite number that would pass this first test.

What includes this destroyed 'infinite number'? All forms of socialism. They already fail. Even ones which theoretically pass this test fail once they get put into practice.

"'I can hit you, but you are not allowed to hit me,' are at the base of all practiced forms of socialism." ---- As Hoppe says.

But there are "other positive norms implied in argumentation aside from the universalization principle," which is only the first principle and one that is "purely [a] formal criterion for morality."

Argumentation...
One: is a practical affair and not only cognitive.
Two: is a subset of action, which means it requires the use of scarce resources.
Three: is an interaction that is conflict-free.

Argumentation does not, so to speak, happen in heaven with floating spirits. It happens here in the 'real world,' a world of scarcity. It is a real and practical affair that takes place between men interacting in a world of scarcity. And argumentation can only happen in such an interacting plane, as far as we are concerned.

It is because of this fact that ethics exist. (In my heaven thought experiment there is no possibility because no conflicts are possible.) Scarcity is what changes this: the scarcity of man's physical body and the scarcity of resources. It then follows that any ethical theory must be a theory of property. Only when this is done can conflicts be avoided over scarce resources.

On the second point we must remember that action implies using certain means. Engaging in argumentation requires the ability to act to get there. There is an objective (i.e., arguing ethics) and, because of this, a means to get there, i.e., to engage in such an action. This is saying nothing less than there are praxeological prerequisites in argumentation and to get to that activity.

On the third point it is clear that arguing/debating can only take place if such a setting is in place. Someone arguing in favor of some proposition that beats up his opponent or enslaves him, by definition, is not intellectually debating or defending the validity of his claim! Argumentation would not be happening. In a correct conflict-free setting there might be disagreement between the arguers, but there can at least be agreement to the fact that there is disagreement.

With these points in mind----i.e., argumentation is conflict-free and is an action----self-ownership is implied. For how can man even begin to engage in argumentation if he does not own himself and therefore control himself to then propose such-in-such? And how can he be an arguer with another if a conflict-aggressive setting is present (which also would violate the right to self-ownership)?

How can the very first philosopher engage in argumentation for the first time in history with another if this is not implied from the very get-go?

Objections

A denial that self-owning individuals do not participate in argumentation would be impossible because in the denial itself it admits to its truth. Any objection to this would be a performative-contradiction.

Trying to say the opposite in regards to the prerequisite of conflict-free interactions, i.e., that everyone can aggress against everyone else, would also be a performative-contradiction because such a proposition can only be proposed in argumentation and hence would already presuppose such conflict-free norms.

Property 'Outside' of the Physical Body (external property)

In this scarce world conflicts can not only arise vis-à-vis physical bodies but also vis-à-vis all other scarce resources that are in existence. (Ethics must be concerned with all scarce goods in existence to rid conflict. This, after all, is the goal of ethics. We cannot just stop with physical bodies.) To formulate any ethical norms in regards to these it must be compatible with the norms examined above. They are formulated because goods are scarce and "not because they are particular kinds of scarce goods."

"Uniform principles" are required to rule out all potential conflicts over scarce goods.

This requires (and will be expanded on below) accepting the natural theory of private property: Meaning man has exclusive control over his body. It is his property. He can do what he wants with it or to it as long as he does not physically aggress (i.e., invade without voluntary consent) against another's property. He can also use his physical body to acquire more property, as long as no one else has put use to it into their own private ownership first, by transforming a state of nature into his own usage and therefore his own control. The only other (nonaggressive) way he can acquire property is by voluntary exchange with another man. This is by exchanging property titles from a previous-owner to a new-owner. The previous-owner himself either obtained his property (as long as it was nonaggressively) through acquiring it in a state of nature (i.e., homesteading it) or through voluntary property title exchange. If it is the latter, then someone down the line of exchanges himself acquired it via the former method.

Argument Against (alienable) Property: A universal ethic saying that man cannot own property except for his physical body would cause the extinction of man. Entering the field of ethics, and hence argumentation, would never come about.

It is only because such property must be acceptable to own that man can then enter such a field.

Acquiring Property is Objective Based on Action; Not Verbal Decree: It would only be possible to disregard man's acquisition of property and allow another man to take it as his own without the voluntary consent of the original owner if property could be obtained by verbal declaration. (Declarations on ethical questions require argumentation. But, again, action praxeologically comes before such.)

Accepting this as true would infer that man's self-ownership of his physical body is also based on mere declaration. But a man cannot just declare another body as his own! Instead his ownership of himself is based on his action. Action comes before any (true or false) declaration, and hence any declaration presupposes self-ownership.

Declarations fail because they do not resolve ethical problems. This is because they do not solve what declarations over ownership of scarce resources to be true. It thus creates rather than ends conflicts.

Likewise, the ownership of external property must be presupposed in ethics. Again, he must own such property to live and for the question of ethics to come about. The only way he can do that is by homesteading (and later, in a developed society, contractualism), which is an action. Hence to declare that homesteading is to be limited or restricted, and is not an absolute, is to fall into the above problems. The actions of appropriating property come before any declaration.

Man can only own property if he put such property into use before anyone else.

If homesteading restrictions were in place, they would mean nothing for the simple fact that if one man were to homestead to said restricted area nothing could be done about it because interference would imply the interferer now has (some form of) property rights in said area. The problem of ethics would not be solved because now an irresolvable conflict over scarce resources is in place. (I.e., who owns---legitimately controls---it?) To loop back to the previous point, furthermore the only way that this restriction could be put into place is by declaration. The action of homesteading a state of nature into property is universal and objective. It is not objectively breakable, so to speak. Interference would conflict with the original acceptance of homesteading.

[Accordingly, and if my interpretation is valid, it seems that recent critics of Hoppe's argumentation ethics are baseless. To say that, for example, man's arms are not empirically required, and hence a valid universal proposition can be argued that all arms should be cut off, in argumentation misses the point. Man comes into argumentation with his arms intact and is presupposed in ownership by his objectively discernible actions beforehand, if he wants to remain logically and praxeologically consistent and not fall into contradiction (and at the same time wants his arms----if he does not, nothing is stopping him from cutting them off)!]

[Being conflict-free, one can ask: What is the only way to obtain personal wealth without running into irresolvable conflicts? Of course, by homesteading, producing, and contracting private property. Anything else is expropriation. The moment one can take from another man's property ------ i.e., earn wealth by doing such, without the consent of this man ------ is to run into conflict of who owns X. If it can be said that the 'thief' owns X, then did the 'original' owner own it beforehand? If so, then nothing is said at all because everything can be proved and disproved. Like in mathematics, a theory that can do this is no theory at all. All that is left is conflict----not ethics. If not, then just-ownership must come about from the second user-controller, i.e., a late-comer who comes after the first. However, if this is the case, then how did the first person get to his position? It must be considered un-just if he does not get approval from the second just-owner. But how can we determine the second late-comer before the fact? And what about the second man's ownership claim relative to the next late-comer, i.e., a third man relative to the first? Logically one must ask this question for the third, fourth, fifth, ... person. Society would die out and ethics would not exist.

On the other hand, if X and all pieces of property are taken to be owned by 'everyone,' society will suffer the same fate. First, ethics is not solved by this 'solution' because conflict has not been taken off the table. On the contrary, it has been amplified. Second, to abide to the principle is physically and practically impossible. To get everyone's 'democratic' permission on the usage over scarce property would require all of mankind's consent. Man would be long dead before this task could be accomplished. And this task would be impossible to implement without consent already being there to do such a priori. It must assume a collective-mind and collective-ownership from the start. This is not reality. Instead to try to justify this ethics would require argumentation and argumentation is based on, and can only be based on, methodological individualism. (And, in a somewhat overlapping manner, cutting everyone arms off is a collectivist idea, too.)]

Rationalist vs. Natural Rights Approach

The natural rights approach takes the position that universal norms can be found of man by looking at his nature. Hoppe's more rationalist approach is narrower compared to the broader and more general approach of looking at man's nature. This gives it an large advantage.

[For a natural rights perspective, see Murray Rothbard's brilliant The Ethics of Liberty.]

"Ought" vs. "Is"

Is an "ought" being derived from an "is"? Argumentation ethics is filled with "is" statements: e.g., ethics is argumentative, a priori.

The a priori of argumentation does not imply that other (incompatible) rules of conduct cannot be enforced.

Man can get scientific facts wrong. He can also speak scientific facts which are not true intentionally. The same is true in ethics. Although, Hoppe writes, the ethics we are talking about is more fundamental than empirical scientific research because it is implied in acting and arguing man.

Man can say that 1+1=7, but that does not change the fact. He can also try to act as if it were 7, but that still does not change the fact that it is not 7 but 2.

Impossibility Proof vs. Refutations via Empiricalism...

Just because ethics is studied in an environment with institutionalized aggression (via the State) does not dispute argumentation ethics. The point is that man cannot do so without falling into internal contradiction to the very foundation of the science of ethics. (Any disprove of argumentation ethics, thus, is not to come about via empirical examples of argumentation happening in some kind of statist framework.)

Property: Capitalism, Socialism, Physical vs. Psychic Integrity, Prior-Later Distinctions, Contractualism

Physical Integrity versus Value/Psychic Integrity...

Aggression under socialism is an 'attack' on the latter. In that sense, socialism is but a form of conservatism because socialism must preserve the current values of property and justify them being where they are.

The value of private property does not just change by the actions of the individual owner ---- it also changes by the subjective preferences and actions of others. Preferences and actions are outside of an individual's control. Value is in the head of an individual.

In order to hold constant property values no one would be allowed to act in anyway. Because by acting it is implied that values will be changing. No one would know ex ante if his action would be viewed as 'good' or 'bad' for various people. In order to act, man must get the 'okay' from everyone. But everyone would be dead before that could be accomplished. (And how could such a task, which is an action, be done, anyhow?) From a more practical perspective of implementation, it would have to introduce physical aggression as an acceptable norm. But this, too, would get into contradiction with the foundation of ethics (argumentation).

Ethics deals with ending conflict over scarce resources. The subject would not exist if this were not the case. And the only way for man to enter ethics is that he can act to get there first. Actions, writes Hoppe, "must be allowed to be performed prior to any actual agreement or disagreement." They are implied beforehand. Given that man can do this, then there must be "objective borders of property," i.e., borders which can be objectively identified by man "without having to agree first with anyone else with respect to one's system of values and evaluations." Socialism, itself, must admit this.

(John Rawls and Robert Nozick... Hoppe notes that both figures support socialism's protection of values versus integrity. For Rawls, a man increasing his amount of wealth relative to someone else has 'aggressed' upon that person. This 'victimized' man has a claim to take property away from the 'aggressor.' The only way to justify this is to say that values must be protected. For Nozick, it is acceptable for a "dominant protection agency" to outlaw competition. Nozick also believed it is acceptable to outlaw "nonproduction exchanges" despite the fact that they might not be actual forms of aggression or threats thereof [e.g., blackmail]. He could only defend such a position by saying that property values must be preserved and not integrity.)

Private Property implies Prior and Later distinction...

Socialism also runs into troubles because it ignores the difference between prior and later in property ownership, which is implied in ethics. Instead it says that priority does not matter: late-comers have as much right as first-comers.

Problems: Like was covered above in the brackets, with such a rule no one would do anything! Mankind would die out with such a rule. It is only because man can acquire property "at a definite point in time" that he can do so at all. It is not a "timeless" act.

Also, it is only possible for exchange and contract to take place because acquiring property happens at definite points in time. For two men to make a voluntary exchange or contractual agreement there must first be recognition that each of them owns their respected property prior to any exchange or contract. Thus, as one man exchanges X to another there is, and must be, an distinction between prior and later.

Argumentation: Prior-later must be observed in argumentation for argumentation to take place. To say that late-comers and first-comers are no different from each other in any way no one would be able to say or argue anything.

Conclusion

In brief, for the above outlined reasons all forms of socialism (i.e., any form of aggression against private property, including man's physical body) fail. The only justifiable system must be a pure capitalist order, a.k.a. anarcho-capitalism.

Implied in such a private property framework is a theory of justice. Self-ownership implies the right to self-defense. Ownership of alienable property also implies man's right to defend such property from aggression, and also therefore implies man's right to recover stolen property. Etc. [See chapters 12 and 13 of The Ethics of Liberty for analysis.]

If Hoppe is correct, then the truth of violence (private or public) being an evil is right before our eyes and is the aprioristic basis of all ethical theories. The task is to see this truth and convince the masses.